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valuable because it shows that Peano’s influence is greater and 
covers a broader field than seems to be known. The book gives 
more than a sketch of Peano’s life and work. It contains inter- 
esting information on the general situation of mathematics at 
the turn of the century. It should be observed that the work of 
Italian mathematicians in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century -- at least their results in the field of analysis -- 
seems not always to be recognized as it ought to be. This calls 
for further research and publication. The present monograph is 
a first step. 
The pamphlet contains a picture of Peano and a facsimile 
reproduction of a letter from Peano to Bertrand Russell. 
GOETHE KAK ESTESTVOISPYTATEL [Goethe as a Natural Scientist]. 
By 1.1. Kanaev. Leningrad (Izdatelstvo “Nauka”) . 1970. 
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Reviewed by Martin Dyck 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
“Goethe as a Natural Scientist” strikes one as a balanced 
summation of the poet-philosopher-scientist’s activities and 
axioms in Goethean Science. Mr. Kanaev , an admirably Goethe- 
oriented Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, negotiates the pivots 
of Goethean Science on the elusive boundaries of the objective 
and subjective. Six chapters successively deal with Goethe’s 
more immediate immersion into nature and its meaning (“1~ zhizni 
Goethe-naturalista”), with morphology, the theory of color, with 
“inorganic nature,” and in the final chapter, with the inter- 
merging of the poet’s artistic and naturalistic endeavors (“Nauka 
i iskusstvo”). A 26-page chart (“Kratkaya sinkhronisticheskaya 
tablitsa”) -- “diasynchronic” would be more accurate -- juxtaposes 
in six columns the major events of Goethe’s life, his scientific 
pursuits, his poetical creations, all with concurrent developments 
in science and technology, in philosophy, literature, and the 
arts, and lastly, in the first column, with socio-political 
history. The chart reader’s rising expectation drops to disen- 
chantment in the text proper of the book: the author delicately 
desists from more explicitly correlating the first column with 
the fifth, or any other. Evidently the chart was meant merely to 
tantalize the reader’s imagination (as a sort of appetizer to 
trick the reader to bring his own food). 
A 19-page bibliography, inevitably selective, is conspicuous 
with certain non-selections: hardly from nescience, due perhaps 
to the ticklish ideological problem of grappling with such 
standard studies as Friedrich Gundolf’s brilliant Goethe book of 
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1916 (a work of undiminished significance; with its short but 
potent chapter on the poet’s relation to mathematics) and Karl 
Vidtor’s geistesgeschichtliche Zusammenschau of Goethe’s Dichtung/ 
Wissenschaft/Weltbild (1949). None of the few important treatises 
on the interplay of art and science in Goethe are listed. An 
absorption of Gunther Mtlller’s contributions to an understanding 
of the poet’s literary works in terms of the poet-scientist’s 
notions of morphology (for example) might have strengthened the 
weakest chapter in the book, that on art-and-science. Yet on the 
whole, bibliography and text attest the author’s deep familiarity 
with the primary sources most relevant to his study. 
Turning now to the impressive lo-page encyclopedia-style sec- 
tion on Goethe and mathematics (pp. 290-299), the reviewer (who 
has a book on the subject in progress, with some 2000 Goethean 
pronouncements on matters mathematical collected) must resist 
the temptation to overwhelm the reader and the author (and the 
editor) with a book-length book review. Mr. Kanaev ‘s summary is 
one of the best I have seen: soberly factual, nicely braced with 
quotations (with Goethe’s distinctive terminology -- in the 
original -- neatly tucked in after the most careful renderings 
into Russian). Yet most of his generalizations (inevitably of 
some degree of generality) are, strictly speaking, untenable (in 
degrees ranging from “infinitesimal” to more marked ones); his 
generalizations need careful qualification (some such qualifica- 
tion, of course, is implicit in the simultaneous viewing of his 
mosaic of limited-scope individual sentences and paragraphs). 
Even those statements that are discernible as almost literal 
transpositions of some of Goethe’s own pronouncements on mathe- 
matics are, in some cases, inaccurate as generalizations. 
Mathematik,or any of its synonyms or subterms, can mean many 
different things to Goethe. The term “mathematics” has always 
been used loosely by non-mathematicians, particularly by non- 
scientists, of course, especially before the various modern 
formalizations beginning in the nineteenth century. A dozen 
distinctions must be drawn to come to grips with Goethe’s complex 
and manifold responses to the various branches, modes, and 
aspects of mathematics. A carefree or even careless use of 
mathematical terminology in the era of Goethe and Euler does not 
necessarily imply inexactitude in the underlying conceptions, 
neither in Euler (from the modern rigorous mathematical point of 
view) nor, in the humanistic domain, in Goethe (in terms of the 
poet’s own rigor in his thinking and expression). We must 
distinguish between Goethe’sobservations on mathematics proper 
and those on mathematicians. In the latter he deplored a lack of 
humanistic culture produced by mathematics. Rarely, of course, 
has any mathematician made such claims for his art-and-science. 
Quite the contrary, the “purer” the mathematician, the more 
austere the “purification ” from Menschliches, Allzmnschliches. 
Implicit in Goethe’s high expectations of mathematics in its 
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in its humanizing force is a high esteem for mathematics (and 
not a low one as surface interpreters have so often maintained). 
Moreover, Goethe does not confine his criticism of a scholarly 
discipline in its failure to humanize the scholar to mathematics, 
he extends it to philology and literature: “Mit Philologen und 
Mathematikern ist kein heiteres Verhgltnis zu gewinnen,” Goethe 
wrote to Zelter on 18 January 1823. Indeed, Mr. Kanaev, in 
another context, makes reference to a more powerful passage, in 
this context: “Schon fast seit einem Jahrhundert wirken Humaniora 
nicht mehr auf das Gemiit dessen der sie treibt und es ist ein 
rechtes Gliick, dass die Natur dazwischengetreten ist, das 
Interesse an sich gezogen und uns von ihrer Seite den Weg zur 
HumanitPt getiffnet hat” (25 November 1808 letter to Knebel). 
Goethe’s remarks on mathematics as a “foreign language” and 
as Dialektik are seen too narrowly by Mr. Kanaev (p . 291f .) . A 
persistent awareness of the limitations of all languages (inclu- 
ding symbolic) in grappling with reality, and especially with the 
Urphlnomene, runs through Goethe’s thought and art: limitations 
not confined to mathematics (as has so frequently been misinter- 
preted before), but inherent in the very medium in which Goethe’s 
creative genius has manifested itself on the highest levels: in 
his own native tongue (cf. the reviewer’s discussion of this 
point in PMLA 73(December 1958): 513). 
Mathematik can mean to Goethe “pure mathematics” (which in its 
purity he tends to exalt), “applied mathematics” (especially 
Messkunst and Rechenkunst), the particular field of science to 
which mathematics is applied (mainly physics), “misapplied mathe- 
matics” (the pejorious designation is not confined to Newtonian 
optics -- Mr. Kanaev seems to perpetuate the myth -- but includes 
various pseudomathematical approaches to some of the humanities 
such as Arnold’s Sacra mathesis (1676) or de Lobkowitz’ Mathesis 
audax (1644)). Mathematik can refer to the branches of the 
discipline he favored (geometry, algebra) as well as to those he 
disfavored (calculus). Thus the second half of Mr. Kanaev’s 
assertion “Goethe utverzhdal , chto ego prirode chuzhdy i zmereniya 
i schet, a v etom on videl prezhde vsego sut matematiki” (p. 290) 
is simply untenable (even if several pronouncements by Goethe 
seem to say that). It is true that in his work Goethe avoided 
measurement and calculation (but then again he explicitly recog- 
nized the value of the two processes as such and when done by 
others), but he did not see in these the “essence of mathematics.” 
Mr. Kanaev corrects himself later in the text by pointing to 
more essential properties seen by Goethe in mathematics. Mr. 
Kanaev rightly emphasizes the rich range of significance of 
Goethe’s usages of the term Physik. It is amazing how many other- 
wise intelligent readers of Goethe’s writings, literary and 
scientific, humanists and scientists, have underestimated Goethe’s 
intelligence by attributing to him crude statements on Mathematik 
and Physik when “crudenessl’ more accurately reflects or reflected 
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the state of discernment in readers hastening down the road of 
the "obvious " . 
The historical and conceptual intersection of Goethe and 
Mathematics is one of the pivots of the History of Science and 
of the Humanities: historically at that moment when the physical 
sciences in certain ways reach and surpass the influence previously 
exerted by theology, literature, and philosophy; conceptually the 
pivot has commanded the attention of dozens of Greats in diverse 
fields: from Schopenhauer and Helmholtz to Valery and Heisenberg. 
Mr. Kanaev's succinct section on the subject serves as an invita- 
tion to further inquiry. 
All in all, Mr. Kanaev's book is the best on the subject in 
one volume I have seen, even in the tongue of Goethe. The 
reviewer wishes to close the review with the motto with which 
Mr. Kanaev opens his book, a maxim of Goethe that is as appropriate 
to a viewing of Goethe and Science as to Goethe's viewing of 
science: Die Geschichte der Wissenschaft ist die Wissenschaft 
selbs t . 
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(Macdonald) and New York (American Elsevier). 1972. 282 p. 
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Reviewed by Laszlo Vekerdi 
Mathematics Research Institute, Budapest 
A theory and a pudding are certainly very different things 
but in a certain sense they can be compared: the proof (or the 
refutation) of both being the eating. Moreover, subjective taste 
has something to do with theories as well. Thus Mr. Aiton has 
rendered a truly good servicein presenting a complete assortment 
of late seventeenth and early eighteenth century vortex theories 
versus attraction theories. By reviewing -- and reviving -- a 
wide variety of now largely forgotten theories he not only recon- 
structs an absolutely necessary though somewhat aberrant round- 
about in the evolution of ideas, but also discloses a lot about 
the subtle and elusive role of scientific taste (or "theory- 
ladenness") in the choice between theories and ideas in complex 
problem situations. 
After a brief survey of the main features of the pre-Cartesian 
(Copernican) celestial dynamics and the theory of falling bodies, 
the author gives a fully documented description of Descartes' 
vortex theory, emphasizing that it was a theory of universal 
gravitation as against "the Keplerian idea of gravity as a mutual 
attraction between heavy bodies and the earth." This early 
rivalry is then inherited by the successors of the two theories, 
but the roles with respect to universality are exchanged: in 
